Abstract
Securing a computer can be a daunting task. To aid in hardening a computer, there are many documents and programs out there that will help in this. There are many vendor documents that can lead you through securing a specific computer. Other non-vendor specific organizations also specialize in securing systems like the national institute of standards and technologies (NIST). This lab examines how to reverse engineer one of these documents so that vulnerabilities can be discovered in specific computers.
In this lab this group will take the NIST document SP 800-68 Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist and reverse engineer this document to find vulnerabilities in the Windows XP SP 2 operating system. The lab will examine each step of the SP 800-68 document and provide the vulnerability associated to that step, what layer of the OSI 7 layer model that vulnerability works at, and how that vulnerability fits into McCumber’s cube. This lab will also examine rollups and service packs and determine what tools will take advantage of each of those vulnerabilities.
Literature Review
The articles in lab five varied in subject. The article, Vulnerability Assessment Tools, gave a general overview of the feasibility of penetration testing and application testing. The articles Vulnerability Testing of Software System Using Fault Injection and Testing with Hostile Data Streams dealt with testing applications via injecting data into them. The article Viruses 101 gave an overview of a course that taught students how to create and protect themselves from malicious programs. The last article, Topological analysis of network attack vulnerability, described a tool that created attack paths based on vulnerabilities on the network.
In the article, Vulnerability Assessment Tools, a general overview of network penetration and application testing was given. The article explained how penetration testing is not the end all be all solution to network security and other types of test need to be conducted as well. The author of the article described how this testing could be done via in house or by a consultant, but came to the conclusion that a hybrid of the two be used , since consultants would not be familiar with all aspects of the network (Wales, n.d., p.17). The article then went into the testing of applications such as web applications. The author described the testing of applications as a more complex process which could result in the compromise of its validation service (Wales, n.d., p.17).The article contained a few errors and omissions. There did not appear to be any type of methodology to the article. The first sentence in the abstract was incomplete. The conclusion was one sentence long. The article also did not contain any references.
In the article Vulnerability Testing of Software System Using Fault Injection the author proposes a means of security testing software using fault injection (Du, 1998). This paper was introduced in the first lab of this course and was used to help set up the current lab. In this lab we are looking at the idea of finding vulnerabilities in a target machine. This paper could be used as a guide in performing fault injection on the existing software located on the target machine to discover any faults in the target machine’s software that can be exploited. This article has some similarities to the article, given in the list of readings in this lab, Testing with Hostile Data Streams (Jorgensen, 2003). In (Du, 1998) the writer is proposing a test in which faults are injected into the software in question by means of the environment around that software. This environment might be direct interaction with the application from outside sources like global variables, files, and network elements. The author runs the application and determines if the application is secure by altering the environment around the application and studying the reactions of the application. This altering could mean replacing a file the application uses with a malicious or faulty file or changing a global variable to cause a fault in the application. In the article Vulnerability Assessment Tools, the author also pointed out that injecting SQL coding into an application could cause the validation service within to become reduced, diminished, bypassed, or stopped (Wales, n.d.,p.17).In (Jorgensen, 2003) the writer takes a blackbox approach to the testing of the stability of an application. This article proposes a technique of introducing randomly deformed data streams into the application to trigger a buffer overflow. This buffer overflow then could be used to introduce arbitrary code into the application causing the application to act in a different manner than it was supposed to. In this lab we are looking at how we can reverse engineer a security document to compromise a target computer in order to help better understand how vulnerabilities could be discovered in unlikely means. These two documents could be used as guides to examine ways to introducing code injection into software to compromise that target computer.
In the article Viruses 101 (Aycock, Barker, 2005) the writers propose a controversial class on viruses and malware. In the class the students learn the basics of how viruses and malware are created and how they work. The class was deemed controversial because of one of the assignments of the course. In the course one of the assignments was to create a virus. This was also coupled with how to defend against them. The paper covers three questions about the validity of the course: 1.) How should the course be taught? 2.) Can this course be taught safely? 3.) Would teaching this course make the world worse or better? For the first question the class was taught by doing rather than hearing or seeing. This meant the students had to actually write a virus and learn to defend against it. The second question was answered by designing a safe environment that the viruses could be written in without any consequences. The final question was answered in that malware is a valid area study and can be easy to create in a safe environment. There were strict requirements for this class. The class that is presented in this article has many similarities to this course that this lab belongs to. There is a strong sense of opposition to the course this lab belongs to because of its nature. This whole course is about learning how to perform penetration tests on networks. If this information is misused, then this course could lead to teaching how to compromise systems for gain and not to help secure the targets.
In the article, Topological analysis of network attack vulnerability, the concept of low level vulnerabilities being combined to achieve higher attack goals was presented. The article also introduced the Topological Analysis Tool, which modeled network security conditions and attack techniques, automatic population of models via Nessus, and the analysis of attack sequences that lead to attack goals (Jajodia, Noel, O’Berry, n.d., p.247). The information gathered from the tool allowed the authors to build a database, which helped develop a rule base of exploits (Jajodia et al., n.d., p.248). The data was then put into a custom analysis engine, which created a set of attack paths leading from the initial network state to a pre-determined attack goal (Jajodia et al., n.d., p.248).The methodology used in the article was of an experimental design, for the tool was used to analyze a scenario where the attack goal was to gain root access. The article contained one error. The authors considered it acceptable to launch counter attacks against the attacker and somehow concluded that such an attack would be the only way for the victim’s network to continue to function after the attack (Jajodia et al., n.d., p.264). The article related to the lab in that it relied on Nessus to produce information about the vulnerabilities that were on a system, just as the teams have used the tool to do the same in their virtual environments.
Methodology
This lab examines the national institute of standards and a technology (NIST) document SP 800-68. The lab uses the NIST document to discover what vulnerabilities exist in the Windows XP SP2 operating system. This lab will construct two tables. The first table will show what vulnerabilities are present in the Windows XP SP2 operating system that will be derived from the steps given in the NIST document. The second table will contain a list of security patches that the NIST document recommends to apply to the operating system and what tools would be used to exploit that vulnerability. This lab shows how a document that is meant to secure a computer could be used to uncover vulnerabilities in a system.
In the first part of this lab we took the SP 800 – 68 NIST document and examined each change the NIST document recommended and listed them in a table. The list of NIST recommended changes included a list of policies included on a security policy template. For each change the NIST document recommends, a vulnerability is assigned that the change prevents or fixes. The fixes and vulnerabilities are then examined to determine what layer of the OSI model each item fits into and how that item falls into McCumber’s cube.
The second part of the lab is a table that contains a list of recommended patches given by the NIST SP 800 – 68 document. To get the list of the patches needed to apply to the Window XP SP2 operating system, the team turned to the Microsoft web site for the most recent updates. The team retrieved the list of patches included in the SP 3 patch provided by Microsoft. The list was reduced down to the security patches to eliminate the hotfixes that are just fixes for bugs in applications on the operating system. Each security patch was then examined and determined how that vulnerability was exploited and a tool or description of how the vulnerability was exploited was assigned to each patch. The Microsoft TechNet site was utilized to provide information on what vulnerability the patch fixed, how that vulnerability could be exploited, and other useful information about it.
Results
This lab showed how a security document could be used to gain knowledge about vulnerabilities on a specific machine. The analysis of the national institute of standards and technologies (NIST) SP 800 – 68 document revealed many security holes that could be found in a machine running Windows XP SP 2 or later. Analysis of what security patches are able to fix can give a malicious attacker the insight on what vulnerabilities are open on machines that did not have that security patch applied to it.
In the first part of the lab we constructed the table that corresponds to the changes made by the NIST document SP 800 – 68. This list compiles all the types of vulnerabilities that can be exploited if the NIST SP 800 – 68 security standard is not applied to a Windows XP SP 2 machine. Each of the changes was then lined up with one of the OSI model layers and also determined were it fit into McCumber’s cube. Examining the list the group noticed that most of the changes are made in the application layer. This is obvious given that the changes that are made are made to the Windows settings which lie in the application layer of the OSI model. There were a few changes in other layers but very few. Most of the changes fit into the confidentiality and integrity group of McCumber’s cube because the NIST document was fixing vulnerabilities that allow access to a machine or exposes information on that machine. There was a good amount of variance between the states of the information, but most of them were located in ether storage or processing. The NIST document concentrated on securing just the Windows XP environment and did not delve into anything outside that environment. For this reason most of the states of the information did not pertain to the transmission of the information. There was a large section that deals with setting the policies of the Windows XP environment. With these settings we considered them policies instead of technology. The changes from the NIST document covered a lot of areas of the Windows XP environment. Most of the changes done to the environment dealt with enhancing user authentication, encryption, and removing unused components (Applications, policies, accounts, user groups, etc.). The NIST document was organized very well. The NIST document divides the types of computers that would use the Windows XP SP 2 operating system. These types are: SOHO or stand alone computers, enterprise, specialized security – limited functionality, and legacy. The type this group examined in this paper was the stand alone. The group decided on the stand alone, for the reason that the Windows XP machine in this lab would be considered a stand alone. The NIST document starts at the prepping of the machine the operating system is going to be installed on and continues through to the maintenance of the machine.
In the second part of the lab the group took a list of patches released with Microsoft’s service pack 3 release and analyzed the vulnerabilities the patches fixed. The list of patches that were analyzed consisted of just the security patches given in the service pack 3 release, for the reason that the hotfixes were only fixes to bugs in the applications included in the Windows operating system. The security patches were then given a tool or description of an exploit that could take advantage of the vulnerability that the patch would fix. This part of the lab shows how someone could use a list of patches to exploit against a machine that was not brought up to date on the most current patches. When the group examined the table it was noticed that most of the vulnerabilities needed the assistance of the user to do a particular task. The task that most of the vulnerabilities required included visiting malicious web sites, opening malicious e-mails, or opening malicious files. There were very few vulnerabilities that the attacker could exploit that did not need the assistance of the user. It was also noticed that a lot of the vulnerabilities dealt with packet manipulation. This allowed for one tool to be used for a lot of the vulnerabilities. The tool the group used was Packit. Packit was used for its ability to analyze, redirect, and modify a variety of packets on the network.
Issues
A lot of the vulnerabilities that were exposed by service pack 3 for Windows XP were hard to match to one particular tool. This was because those vulnerabilities required scripts or programs that were designed for a specific vulnerability, file, or application. A lot of the vulnerabilities required development of web sites, e-mails, or specific files.
Conclusion
Lab five required the student teams to discover vulnerabilities in operating systems by analyzing documentation that describes configuration changes that would be used to enhance the security of the operating systems. If an operating system did not make the changes that were recommended, the settings and services that are unchanged could be used as channels of attack against the system. Group four analyzed a NIST document on securing Windows XP and tabulated the results in relation to the OSI model, McCumber’s cube, and identified exploits that could occur if the recommendation was not followed. Besides analyzing the NIST document, the team also analyzed and tabulated vulnerabilities that were mitigated by Service pack 3 as well as identify tools that could be used against the given vulnerabilities. From this research, the team discovered that most vulnerabilities came from users stumbling across malicious websites or e-mail that in turn executed scripts and files on the user’s system.
Tables
Table 1: Analysis of the Changes Made to Secure a Windows XP SP 2 Professional in the NIST SP 800 – 68 Document
Change |
Exploit |
OSI Layer |
McCumber |
Restrict access to equipment |
Accessing unauthorized equipment |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Enabling a logon warning banner |
Gaining access to an unauthorized computer |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Stronger password requirements |
Cracking simple passwords |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Use of different password multiple applications |
Using known passwords to gain access into multiple applications |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Establishing a checkout policy for departing employees |
Using known passwords and usernames to gain access to unauthorized computers |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Restrict access to equipment |
Accessing unauthorized equipment |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Enabling a logon warning banner |
Gaining access to an unauthorized computer |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Stronger password requirements |
Cracking simple passwords |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Use of different password multiple applications |
Using known passwords to gained access into multiple applications |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Establishing a checkout policy for departing employees |
Using known passwords and usernames to gain access to unauthorized computers |
8 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Create software restriction policy |
Unwanted software that could cause conflicts could be run |
8 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Securing the BIOS |
Changing the BIOS to boot from a third-party live OS flash drive or CD |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Securing the files using encryption |
Accessing unauthorized files |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Enabling password authentication and screen saver protection |
Gaining access to an unauthorized computer |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Secure administrative-level access to tools, files, and settings |
Accessing administrative-level tool, files, and settings to accomplish exploit |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable unused local privilege services |
Exploiting unused service to escalate privileges |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Encrypt sensitive data |
Accessing unauthorized files |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Disable unused local network services |
Exploiting unused service to breach a system |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Use of firewalls on services |
Gaining access to an unauthorized computer via a port |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Use of anti-virus and spyware removal software |
Introduction of viruses and malware to gain information or access to a computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Use of spam filtering in e-mail applications |
DoS attack or introduction of viruses and malware |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Restrict connections to non-approved applications to connect to unknown servers (e.g., P2P, IM) |
Introduce malicious code that takes advantage of these applications to connect to malicious servers |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Limit the use of administrative level usage |
Using administrative usage to accomplish a malicious attack |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Putting data on a separate partition |
Loss of data when a hard drive is corrupted |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Technology |
During a custom network setup to disabling network clients, services, and protocols that are not needed |
Use of a weak network client, service, or protocol to gain access to a computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Chose to be in a workgroup and change the default workgroup name |
Spoofing fake domain names to gain access to a domain based network |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Add only one account during installation |
Adding accounts that could be exploited to do malicious attacks |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Waiting to install a current service pack until tested properly |
Faults in a service pack could be used to exploit the computer in ways it could not be exploited before the patch |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Turn on automatic updates, but install the updates according to the user |
Scan for the newest vulnerabilities on the computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Use of MBSA to verify that vulnerabilities are patched |
Scan for the newest vulnerabilities on the computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Maximum password age of 90 days |
Low number leads to poor password use and high number leads to easier compromised passwords |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Minimum password age of 1 day |
Compromised passwords that are used over and over |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Minimum password length of 8 characters |
Easy to crack passwords |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Enabling password must meet complexity requirements |
Easy to crack passwords |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Enforce password history |
Use old passwords to compromise a computer |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Disabling reversible encryption for all users in the domain |
Easy decryption of passwords to use in compromising a computer |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Use of account lockout threshold |
Multiple attempts to guess a password |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Setting lockout duration to 15 minutes |
Multiple attempts to guess a password |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Setting account lockout counter after 15 minutes |
Multiple attempts to guess a password |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Policy |
Audit account logon events when successful |
Cover the tracks of a malicious user |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Audit account management when successful |
Cover the tracks of a malicious user |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Audit logon events when successful |
Cover the tracks of a malicious user |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Audit policy change when successful |
Cover the tracks of a malicious user |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Audit system events when successful |
Cover the tracks of a malicious user |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only users and administrators to log on locally |
Use guest account to gain access to a computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to change the system time only |
Adjust the system time to hide malicious user’s tracks |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to create a pagefile |
Malicious users can introduce arbitrary code into the computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to debug a program |
Introduction of malicious code into the computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Deny access to this computer from the network from accounts Guests and SUPPORT_38945a0 |
Use these accounts to gain access to the computer and network |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Only allow administrators to force a shutdown from a remote computer |
Cause a computer to shutdown from a remote location |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only the local service and network service to generate security audits |
Falsifying security audits to misguide tracking techniques |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to schedule priorities to processes |
Allow malicious applications to have a higher priority |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to load and unload device drivers |
Allow malicious users to gain access to device drivers |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Do not allow any program to lock an application in memory |
Give a malicious application full priority to memory |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to manage auditing and security log |
Give higher permission access to files, registry entries, and active directory objects |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to modify firmware environment values |
Access and modify firmware devices to gain control of a system |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Policy |
Allow only administrators to perform volume maintenance tasks |
Gain access to extended files and data |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Policy |
Allow only administrators to profile system performance |
Gain information about the process running on a system |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Policy |
Allow only the administrator or user to remove the computer from the docking station |
Allows an attacker to steal the computer and log onto it |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Allow only local services and network services to call the call the CreateProcessAsUser() API |
Use the call the CreateProcessAsUser() API to run malicious applications |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Allow only users and administrators only to shut down a system |
Cause a DoS attack on the computer |
7 |
Availability, Process, Policy |
Allow only administrators to take ownership of any object that can be secured |
Gain access to files, registry keys, active directory objects, etc. |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Disable the guest account |
Gain a foothold on a computer through the guest account |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
User accounts that are accessed outside of the physical machine need a password |
Gain access remotely to an account without a password |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Allow only administrators and interactive users to be able to format and eject removable media |
Cause damage to stored data |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Allow anyone to install a printer driver |
Allow a malicious printer driver to be installed on the computer |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Install but warn about unsigned driver installation |
Installation of malicious drivers without warning |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Enable digitally encrypted or signed secure channel data all the time |
Gain information from the domain members network traffic |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Enable digitally encrypted secure channel data when possible |
Gain information from the domain members network traffic |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Make the domain member change his/her password every 30 days |
Easier to guess a password |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Require a strong session key for encryption |
Easier to decrypt information from the domain user |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Do not allow the last user’s logon name to be displayed |
Use of the logon user name to gain access to the computer |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Policy |
Require a CTRL+ALT+DEL key stroke to activate the logon screen |
Easier to gain password information |
7 |
Confidentiality, Process, Policy |
Use of DoJ approved messages for users attempting to logon |
Misuse of guidance to users to persuade them to do something to cause a security breach |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Use of DoJ approved titles for users attempting to logon |
Misguiding users |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Allow only 2 logons to be cached locally |
Adding malicious accounts to be able to logon using cached logons |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Prompt the user within 14 days to change his/her password |
Could cause a user to be rushed to make up a password |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Allow the domain controller to be unlocked using cached credentials |
Allows a malicious user account with cached credentials to gain access to a computer |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Require the workstation to be locked |
Gain access to a computer through other logon methods |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Require signing of the SMB packets |
Spoofing SMB packets to gain information or attacking systems |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Makes the client request signed SMB packet communication |
Spoofing SMB packets to gain information or attacking systems |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Require suspension of idle sessions after 15 minutes |
Aid in creating a DoS attack |
7 |
Availability, Process, Policy |
Only communicate with a Microsoft client if it uses signed SMB packets |
Spoof SMB packets |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Negotiate SMB signed packets if requested by the client |
Spoof SMB packets |
7 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Policy |
Disconnect clients when logon hours expire |
Allow easier access to a computer that is logged on for long periods of time |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Do not allow anonymous SID/Name translation |
Gain the names of administrators using SID requests |
7 |
Confidentiality, Process, Policy |
Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts |
Grant access to malicious user accounts |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Do not allow anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares |
Grant access to malicious user accounts and access to network shares |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Do not store credentials or .NET passwords for network authentication |
steal credentials and passwords |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Policy |
Do not allow the everyone permission group to be applied to anonymous users |
Gain access to restricted information |
7 |
Confidentiality, Process, Policy |
Allow authenticated users to use their own local account information |
Gain access to the guest account and use tools to gain higher permissions from there |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Do not store LAN manager hash values on next password change |
Retrieve passwords using LAN manager hash values |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Force logoff when logon hours expire |
Allow easier access to a computer that is logged on for long periods of time |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Accept only NTLMv2 and NTLM authentication and session security only |
Use vulnerabilities in LM to gain access to a computer |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Use negotiated signing for the LDAP client signing requirements |
Gain control over directory services using queries from a malicious user |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Need administrator password to gain access to a computer |
Gain access to a computer easier |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Upon clean shutdown the pagefile is cleared |
Gain information from the pagefiles if hard drive is stolen |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Only allow the object creator group to run volume maintenance tasks |
Manipulate the data on a disk drive |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Policy |
Strengthen default permissions of internal system objects |
Make changes to the internal system objects |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Disable autorun for all drives |
Gain access through a media device using autorun to install a malicious application |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Enable safe DLL search mode |
Use of malicious DLLs located in the current directory of a malicious application in place of safe DLLs located on the local machine |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Set the grace period of having to use a password after a screen saver is up to 0 |
Gain access to a computer after the user leaves and the screen saver comes up |
7 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Prevent local guest group from accessing application log |
Gain access to logs to cover tracks |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Prevent local guest group from accessing security log |
Gain access to logs to cover tracks |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Prevent local guest group from accessing system log |
Gain access to logs to cover tracks |
7 |
Integrity, Storage, Policy |
Overwrite application log as needed |
DoS attack by filling the log files |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Policy |
Overwrite security log as needed |
DoS attack by filling the log files |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Policy |
Overwrite system log as needed |
DoS attack by filling the log files |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Policy |
Do not create a backup operators group |
Use backup operators group to gain access to stored files |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Policy |
Do not create a power users group |
Use power users group to gain access to stored files |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Policy |
Securing the BIOS |
Changing the BIOS to boot from a third-party live OS flash drive or CD |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Securing the files using encryption |
Accessing unauthorized files |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Enabling password authentication and screen saver protection |
Gaining access to an unauthorized computer |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Secure administrative-level access to tools, files, and settings |
Accessing administrative-level tool, files, and settings to accomplish exploit |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable unused local privilege services |
Exploiting unused service to escalate privileges |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Encrypt sensitive data |
Accessing unauthorized files |
7 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Disable unused local network services |
Exploiting unused service to breach a system |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Use of firewalls on services |
Gaining access to an unauthorized computer via a port |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Use of anti-virus and spyware removal software |
Introduction of viruses and malware to gain information or access to a computer |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Use of spam filtering in e-mail applications |
DoS attack or introduction of viruses and malware |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Set Maximum application log size to16384 Kb |
DoS |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Technology |
Set maximum security log size to 81920 Kb |
DoS |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Technology |
Set maximum system log size to 81920 Kb |
DoS |
7 |
Availability, Storage, Technology |
Disable Alerter |
N/A |
7 |
N/A |
Disable Clipbook |
Remote computers could view shared information |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Disable IIS Admin Service |
IIS allows FTP and web servers to be run from the computer, thus creating more avenues of attack |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable Messenger |
Messenger could be used to distribute spam and viruses |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable Routing and Remote Access |
Routing and Remote access could be used for remote code execution |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable SMTP |
SMTP is a possible avenue for receiving SPAM and subject to buffer overflow attacks |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable SNMP Service |
SNMP could allow attackers to gain information about network devices and change configurations on them |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable SNMP Trap |
SNMP could allow attackers to gain information about network devices and change configurations on them. Trap is used by the SNMP service. |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable SSDP Discovery Service |
SSDP allows for the discovery of network services |
7 |
Confidentiality, Processing, Technology |
Disable Telnet |
Telnet does not encrypt data being sent or has sufficient authentication |
7 |
Integrity, Transmission, Technology |
Disable default administrator account |
The Administrator accounts is targeted by attackers to compromise the network faster because of admin privileges |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable default guest account |
The guest account has been an avenue for gaining remote access to a computer |
7 |
Confidentiality , Processing, Technology |
Disable user accounts that are inactive over 90 days |
Inactive accounts could be used as a method of attack by attackers inside and outside of the organization |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
create daily use user account |
Administrator accounts for everyday use could give an attacker to compromise the network faster because of admin privileges |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Synchronize with an Internet time server |
Analysis of audit logs are harder to accomplish with inaccurate time |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable NetMeeting Remote Desktop sharing |
Attackers could use this service to access local computers |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable World Wide Web Publishing Services |
This service required IIS admin to run, which is target for attack |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Disable FTP Publishing Service |
If enabled vulnerabilities can be allowed through the FTP site |
7 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Enforce use of strong applications and protocols |
Exploiting weak applications and protocols |
6 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Enforce use of strong applications and protocols |
Exploiting weak applications and protocols |
6 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Enable EFS |
Users with similar or lesser privileges could view unencrypted files |
6 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Disable NETBIOS over TCP/IP |
System resources susceptible to network attacks |
5 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Only allow connection of NTLM SSP based clients if the message integrity is negotiated, encryption is negotiated, the NTLMv2 protocol is used, and 128-bit encryption is used |
Easier to gain access to client information over the network |
4 |
Integrity, Transmission, Policy |
Only allow connection of NTLM SSP based server if the message integrity is negotiated, encryption is negotiated, the NTLMv2 protocol is used, and 128-bit encryption is used |
Easier to gain access to server information over the network |
4 |
Integrity, Transmission, Policy |
Use FIPS complaint algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing |
Bypass encryption to gain access to information being sent over the network |
4 |
Integrity, Transmission, Policy |
Assign IP addresses, default gateway, and DNSs |
Use of exploits that compromise DHCP services to gain access to a computer |
3 |
Integrity, Processing, Technology |
Allow only multicast, broadcast, and ISAKMP packets to bypass the IPSec filter |
Gain access through cretin packets by bypassing the IPSec filter |
3 |
Integrity, Process, Policy |
Encrypting network communications |
Sniffing data on the network |
2 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Technology |
Encrypting network communications |
Sniffing data on the network |
2 |
Confidentiality, Transmission, Technology |
Physically secure physical media |
Stealing physical media |
1 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Physically secure physical media |
Stealing physical media |
1 |
Confidentiality, Storage, Technology |
Table 2: Analysis of Tools That Would Work Against Vulnerabilities Patched By the Service Pack 3 Release
Article number |
Article title |
Previous software update type |
Tool |
841356 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/841356/ ) |
MS04-037: Vulnerability in Windows shell could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Metasploit, Buffer Overload |
871250 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/871250/ ) |
MS05-003: Vulnerability in the Indexing Service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious Query |
873333 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/873333/ ) |
MS05-012: Vulnerability in OLE and COM could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious COM script, Malicious document |
873339 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/873339/ ) |
MS04-043: Vulnerability in HyperTerminal could allow code execution |
Security |
Malicious Hyper Terminal sexton |
885250 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/885250/ ) |
MS05-011: Vulnerability in server message block could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packet Spoofing Tool |
885492 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/885492/ ) |
Microsoft has released a security update to Microsoft Windows Media Player 9 |
Security |
Malicious PNG file |
885835 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/885835/ ) |
MS04-044: Vulnerabilities in Windows Kernel and LSASS could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Buffer overload in a LPC message |
885836 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/885836/ ) |
MS04-041: A vulnerability in WordPad could allow code execution |
Security |
Malicious notepad file that contains a buffer overload |
887219 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/887219/ ) |
MS05-004: ASP.NET path validation vulnerability could allow unauthorized access |
Security |
Malicious URL |
887472 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/887472/ ) |
Microsoft has released a security update to Microsoft Windows Messenger |
Security |
Malicious PNG file |
888113 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/888113/ ) |
MS05-015: Vulnerability in hyperlink object library could allow remote code execution in Windows Server 2003 |
Security |
Malicious hyper link that leads to a buffer overload |
890046 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/890046/ ) |
MS05-032: Vulnerability in Microsoft agent could allow spoofing |
Security |
Use Microsoft Agent to disguise a malicious link |
890047 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/890047/ ) |
MS05-008: Vulnerability in Windows shell could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious web site or e-mail that uses the drag and drop event to save a file to a system |
890175 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/890175/ ) |
MS05-001: Vulnerability in HTML Help could allow code execution |
Security |
Malicious web site that utilizes the HTML help ActiveX control to bypass cross-domain security |
890261 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/890261/ ) |
MS05-009: Vulnerability in PNG processing could lead to buffer overrun |
Security |
Malicious PNG file |
890859 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/890859/ ) |
MS05-018: Vulnerabilities in Windows kernel could allow elevation of privilege and denial of service |
Security |
A malicious programs that utilizes vulnerabilities in the windows kernel to cause a buffer overload to elevate privileges |
891711 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/891711/ ) |
MS05-002: Vulnerability in cursor and icon format handling could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Maliciously crafted icon, cursor, or animated cursor format to gain control of a system |
891781 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/891781/ ) |
MS05-013: Vulnerability in the DHTML editing component ActiveX control could allow code execution |
Security |
Malicious web site that utilizes the DHTML editing component ActiveX control to bypass cross-domain security |
893066 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/893066/ ) |
MS05-019: Vulnerabilities in TCP/IP could allow remote code execution and denial of service |
Security |
Packet Spoofing Tool |
893086 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/893086/ ) |
MS05-016: Vulnerability in Windows Shell that could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious file that makes an application open another file |
893756 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/893756/ ) |
MS05-040: Vulnerability in Telephony service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
TAPI_exp.c |
896358 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896358/ ) |
MS05-026: A vulnerability in HTML Help could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious code that utilizes the HTML help control to execute malicious software |
896422 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896422/ ) |
MS05-027: Vulnerability in Server Message Block could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit tool |
896423 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896423/ ) |
MS05-043: Vulnerability in Print Spooler service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit tool |
896424 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896424/ ) |
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS05-053: Vulnerabilities in graphics rendering engine could allow code execution |
Security |
Malicious code that causes a buffer overload in a program that handles WMF and EMF rendering |
896426 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896426/ ) |
MS05-028: A vulnerability in the Web Client Service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit tool |
896428 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896428/ ) |
MS05-033: Vulnerability in Telnet client could allow information disclosure |
Security |
Malicious web site that has Telnet URLs |
896597 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/896597/ ) |
MS05-022: Vulnerability in MSN Messenger could lead to remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious GIF file |
897715 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/897715/ ) |
MS05-030: Vulnerability in Outlook Express could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious Outlook Express newsgroup server that executes a buffer overload in Outlook Express |
899587 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/899587/ ) |
MS05-042: Vulnerabilities in Kerberos could allow denial of service, information disclosure, and spoofing |
Security |
Packit tool |
899588 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/899588/ ) |
MS05-039: Vulnerability in Plug and Play could allow remote code execution and elevation of privilege |
Security |
Packit tool |
899589 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/899589/ ) |
MS05-046: Vulnerability in the Client Service for NetWare could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit tool |
899591 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/899591/ ) |
MS05-041: Vulnerability in Remote Desktop Protocol could allow denial of service |
Security |
Packit tool |
900725 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/900725/ ) |
MS05-049: Vulnerabilities in the Windows shell could allow for remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious .lnk file |
901190 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/901190/ ) |
MS06-009: Vulnerability in the Korean Input Method Editor (IME) could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Manipulate the Korean IME to gain control of a system |
901214 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/901214/ ) |
MS05-036: Vulnerability in Microsoft Color Management Module could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious image on a web page or e-mail that causes a buffer overload |
902400 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/902400/ ) |
MS05-051: Vulnerabilities in MS DTC and COM+ could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit tool |
903235 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/903235/ ) |
MS05-037: Vulnerability in JView Profiler could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious web site that has a Jview Profiler COM object to help execute malicious code |
904706 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/904706/ ) |
MS05-050: Vulnerability in DirectShow could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious AVI file that causes a buffer overload in DirectShow |
905414 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/905414/ ) |
MS05-045: Vulnerability in Network Connection Manager could allow denial of service |
Security |
Packit tool |
905495 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/905495/ ) |
MS05-044: Vulnerability in the Windows FTP client could allow file transfer location tampering |
Security |
Malicious FTP file with a specially crafted file name |
905749 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/905749/ ) |
MS05-047: Vulnerability in Plug and Play could allow remote code execution and local elevation of privilege |
Security |
Packit tool |
907245 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/907245/ ) |
MS05-048: Vulnerability in the Microsoft Collaboration Data Objects could allow code execution |
Security |
Packit tool |
908519 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/908519/ ) |
MS06-002: Vulnerability in embedded Web fonts could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious web site that has embedded web fount that could be used to cause a buffer overload |
908531 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/908531/ ) |
MS06-015: Vulnerability in Windows Explorer could lead to remote code execution |
Security |
A malicious web site that would connect the target to a malicious file server that would cause IE to execute code |
910620 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/910620/ ) |
MS06-004: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
A malicious WMF image on a malicious web site |
911280 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/911280/ ) |
MS06-025: Vulnerability in Routing and Remote Access could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted message for RASMAN |
911562 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/911562/ ) |
MS06-014: Vulnerability in Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) function could allow code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page or -e-mail |
911564 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/911564/ ) |
MS06-006: Vulnerability in Windows Media Player plug-in with non-Microsoft Internet browsers could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
911565 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/911565/ ) |
MS06-005: Vulnerability in Windows Media Player could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
911567 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/911567/ ) |
MS06-016: Cumulative Security Update for Outlook Express |
Security |
Specially crafted .wab file |
911927 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/911927/ ) |
MS06-008: Vulnerability in Web Client could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted HTTP messages |
912919 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/912919/ ) |
MS06-001: Vulnerability in graphics rendering engine could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page or HTML e-mail |
913433 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/913433/ ) |
MS06-020: Vulnerabilities in Macromedia Flash Player from Adobe could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted SWF file |
913446 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/913446/ ) |
MS06-007: Vulnerability in TCP/IP could allow denial of service |
Security |
Specially crafted IGMP packet |
913580 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/913580/ ) |
MS06-018: Vulnerability in Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator could allow denial of service |
Security |
Packit |
914388 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/914388/ ) |
MS06-036: A vulnerability in the DHCP Client Service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit |
914389 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/914389/ ) |
MS06-030: Vulnerability in Server Message Block could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
valid logon credentials and run SMB oriented applications |
914798 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/914798/ ) |
MS06-011: Permissive Windows services DACLs could lead to elevation of privilege |
Security |
valid logon credentials and run applications |
917159 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/917159/ ) |
MS06-035: Vulnerability in Server service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted SMB message |
917283 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/917283/ ) |
MS06-033: A vulnerability in ASP.NET could allow information disclosure |
Security |
Information disclosure via ASP.net |
917344 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/917344/ ) |
MS06-023: Vulnerability in Microsoft JScript could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
917422 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/917422/ ) |
MS06-051: Vulnerability in the Windows kernel could result in remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
917537 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/917537/ ) |
MS06-034: Vulnerability in Internet Information Services that use Active Server Pages could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted ASP file |
917953 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/917953/ ) |
MS06-032: Vulnerability in TCP/IP could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit |
918118 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/918118/ ) |
MS07-013: Vulnerability in Microsoft Rich Edit could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page with a RTF file |
918439 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/918439/ ) |
MS06-022: Vulnerability in ART image rendering could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page or HTML e-mail |
918899 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/918899/ ) |
MS06-042: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
919007 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/919007/ ) |
MS06-052: Vulnerability in Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM) could result in remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted MSMQ message |
920213 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/920213/ ) |
MS06-068: Vulnerability in Microsoft Agent could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
920214 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/920214/ ) |
MS06-043: Vulnerability in Microsoft Windows could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
920670 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/920670/ ) |
MS06-050: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows Hyperlink Object Library could allow remote code execution |
Security |
malicious hyperlink |
920683 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/920683/ ) |
MS06-041: Vulnerability in DNS resolution could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted DNS communication |
920685 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/920685/ ) |
MS06-053: Vulnerability in Indexing Service could allow cross-site scripting |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
921398 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/921398/ ) |
MS06-045: Vulnerability in Windows Explorer could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted file |
921503 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/921503/ ) |
MS07-043: Vulnerability in OLE Automation could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
921883 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/921883/ ) |
MS06-040: Vulnerability in Server service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted RPC packets |
922616 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/922616/ ) |
MS06-046: Vulnerability in HTML Help could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
922770 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/922770/ ) |
MS06-056: Vulnerability in ASP.NET 2.0 could allow for information disclosure |
Security |
client side script |
922819 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/922819/ ) |
MS06-064: Vulnerabilities in TCP/IP IPv6 could allow denial of service |
Security |
Packit |
923191 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/923191/ ) |
MS06-057: Vulnerability in Windows Explorer could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
923414 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/923414/ ) |
MS06-063: Vulnerability in Server Service could allow denial of service |
Security |
Packit |
923694 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/923694/ ) |
MS06-076: Cumulative security update for Outlook Express |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
923810 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/923810/ ) |
MS07-055: Vulnerability in Kodak Image Viewer could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
923980 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/923980/ ) |
MS06-066: Vulnerability in the Client Service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit |
924191 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/924191/ ) |
MS06-061: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft XML Core Services could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
924270 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/924270/ ) |
MS06-070: Vulnerability in Workstation Service could allow remote code execution |
Security |
sending a valid domain join request to a malicious server |
924496 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/924496/ ) |
MS06-065: Vulnerability in Windows Object Packager could allow remote execution |
Security |
Object Packager |
924667 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/924667/ ) |
MS07-012: Vulnerability in Microsoft Foundation Classes could allow for remote code execution |
Security |
Malicious RTF file |
925454 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/925454/ ) |
MS06-072: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
925486 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/925486/ ) |
MS06-055: Vulnerability in Vector Markup Language could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
925902 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/925902/ ) |
MS07-017: Vulnerability in GDI could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted application while logged in |
926121 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/926121/ ) |
MS06-077: Vulnerability in Remote Installation Services could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted executable |
926247 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/926247/ ) |
MS06-074: Vulnerability in Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted SNMP message |
926255 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/926255/ ) |
MS06-075: Vulnerability in Windows could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Specially crafted application while logged in |
926436 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/926436/ ) |
MS07-011: Vulnerability in Microsoft OLE Dialog could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page with a RTF file |
927779 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/927779/ ) |
MS07-009: Vulnerability in Microsoft Data Access Components could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
927802 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/927802/ ) |
MS07-007: Vulnerability in Windows Image Acquisition Service could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Specially crafted application while logged in |
927977 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/927977/ ) |
MS06-071: Security update for Microsoft XML Core Services 6.0 |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
927978 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/927978/ ) |
MS06-071: Security update for Microsoft XML Core Services 4.0 |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
928090 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/928090/ ) |
MS07-016: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
928255 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/928255/ ) |
MS07-006: Vulnerability in Windows Shell could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Specially crafted application while logged in |
928843 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/928843/ ) |
MS07-008: A vulnerability in the HTML Help ActiveX control could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
929123 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/929123/ ) |
MS07-034: Cumulative security update for Outlook Express and for Windows Mail |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
929969 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/929969/ ) |
MS07-004: Vulnerability in Vector Markup Language could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
930178 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/930178/ ) |
MS07-021: Vulnerability in Windows CSRSS could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted application while logged in |
930494 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/930494/ ) |
Description of the security update for the .NET Framework 1.0 Service Pack 3 for Windows XP Media Center and Windows XP Tablet PC: July 10, 2007 |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
931261 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/931261/ ) |
MS07-019: Vulnerability in UPnP could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted HTTP requests |
931784 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/931784/ ) |
MS07-022: Vulnerability in the Windows kernel could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Specially crafted application while logged in |
933566 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/933566/ ) |
MS07-033: Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
933579 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/933579/ ) |
MS07-042: Description of the security update for Microsoft XML Core Services 6.0: August 14, 2007 |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
933729 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/933729/ ) |
MS07-058: Vulnerabilities in RPC could allow denial of service |
Security |
Specially crafted RPC message |
935839 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/935839/ ) |
MS07-035: Vulnerability in the Win32 API could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
935840 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/935840/ ) |
MS07-031: Vulnerability in Schannel could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
936021 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/936021/ ) |
Description of the security update for Microsoft XML Core Services 3.0: August 14, 2007 |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
936782 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/936782/ ) |
MS07-047: Vulnerability in Windows Media Player could allow remote code execution |
Security |
host a specially crafted skin file |
937894 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/937894/ ) |
MS07-065: Vulnerability in Message Queuing Service could allow remote code execution in Windows XP and in Windows 2000 |
Security |
specially crafted MSMQ message that allows remote code execution |
938127 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/938127/ ) |
MS07-050: Vulnerability in Vector Markup Language could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page or HTML e-mail |
938829 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/938829/ ) |
MS07-046: Vulnerability in GDI could allow remote code execution |
Security |
specially crafted attachment in e-mail |
939373 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/939373/ ) |
MS07-041: Vulnerability in Internet Information Services could allow remote code execution |
Security |
specially crafted URL requests |
939778 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/939778/ ) |
MS07-053: Vulnerability in Windows Services for UNIX could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
set UID binary files |
941202 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/941202/ ) |
MS07-056: Security Update for Outlook Express and Windows Mail |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
941568 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/941568/ ) |
MS07-064: Vulnerabilities in DirectX could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted WAV and AVI format files |
941644 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/941644/ ) |
MS08-001: Vulnerability in TCP/IP could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Packit |
941693 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/941693/ ) |
MS08-025: Vulnerability in Windows Kernel could allow elevation of privilege |
Security |
Run arbitrary code in Kernel mode |
942099 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/942099/ ) |
MS07-054: Vulnerability in MSN Messenger and in Windows Live Messenger could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted Webcam or video chat session |
942615 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/942615/ ) |
MS07-069: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
942830 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/942830/ ) |
MS08-006: Vulnerability in Internet Information Services could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Passing malicious input to a web site’s ASP page |
942831 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/942831/ ) |
MS08-005: Vulnerability in Internet Information Services could allow elevation of privileges |
Security |
Script with write access to FTPRoot, NNTPfile/root or WWWRoot |
943055 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/943055/ ) |
MS08-008: Description of the security update for Windows 2000, for Windows XP, for Windows Server 2003, and for Windows Vista: February 12, 2008 |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
943460 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/943460/ ) |
MS07-061: Vulnerability in Windows URI Handling could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted URIs |
943485 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/943485/ ) |
MS08-002: Vulnerability in LSASS could allow local elevation of privilege |
Security |
Valid logon credentials , specially crafted LPC requests |
944338 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/944338/ ) |
MS08-022: Vulnerability in the VBScript and JScript scripting engines could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
944533 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/944533/ ) |
MS08-010: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
944653 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/944653/ ) |
MS07-067: Vulnerability in Macrovision driver could allow local elevation of privilege |
Security |
Configurations of privileges |
945553 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/945553/ ) |
MS08-020: Vulnerability in DNS client could allow spoofing |
Security |
Modified responses to DNS requests |
946026 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/946026/ ) |
MS08-007: Vulnerability in WebDAV Mini-Redirector could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Modifying Mini-Redirector pathnames |
947864 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/947864/ ) |
MS08-024: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
948590 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/948590/ ) |
MS08-021: Vulnerability in GDI could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Specially crafted EMF or WMF image file |
948881 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/948881/ ) |
MS08-023: Critical security update for ActiveX killbits |
Security |
Specially crafted web page |
950749 (http://support.microsoft.com/ kb/950749/ ) |
MS08-028: Vulnerability in the Microsoft Jet Database Engine could allow remote code execution |
Security |
Modifying msjet40.dll |
.
References
Aycock, J. & Barker, K.(2005). Viruses 101. ACM.
Du, W. & Mathurm, A. (1998). Vulnerability testing of software system using fault injection.
Jajodia,S., Noel,S. & O’ Berry, B.(n.d.). Topological analysis of network attack vulnerability.
Jorgensen, A. (2003). Testing with hostile data streams. ACM.
Microsoft. (2009).Microsoft help and support. Retrieved July 9, 2009 from
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/911280/.
NIST. (2005). Guidance for securing windows xp systems for it professionals: a nist configuration security
checklist.
Wales,E. (n.d.) Vulnerability assessment tools. Network Security.
The literature review was not related to the lab activities very well nor were the assigned readings related, in most cases, to each other. Each paper is evaluated in a paragraph with a summary of the content and the group’s opinions on the validity of the methodology used in the paper. For the first article, how could this be related to the activities of this lab? Aren’t we doing penetration testing? The “n.d.” for the date in the citation shows a lack of research depth. I’ll admit this paper was hard to find information on but it was out there. The third paragraph makes an attempt at relating to the lab activities but only at the exploitation level which we’ve done in previous labs. Take a step back and look at what we’re trying to accomplish in the lab and what they’re doing in these papers. By reverse engineering programs they’re finding security holes. In this lab, we’re reverse engineering a security document to find holes. The next paper you mention in your literature review mentions this principle too. In order to properly defend (or attack) something, you need to know how it’s designed.
The methodologies section for the first section is ok, but the second section misses the point of the lab. The lab directives were to test tools that could be used to exploit the vulnerabilities we discover in the lab. While we were supposed to look at the patching process as an alternate source of vulnerabilities, this work may have been done in vain.
In the findings, a small nitpick to start, you mention a table was create but you don’t mention it (i.e. “Figure 1” or “Table 1.”) This makes it easier for the reader to know exactly what table you’re talking about. Some of the discussion about the sections from the NIST document that were going to be handled vs. others could’ve been listed in the methodologies section instead to add more depth. The tables that were output as part of the findings were difficult to read. They could’ve been formatted to use gridlines and that would have increased the readability significantly.
Some of the items in the table raise questions. How is “restricting access to equipment” a layer eight problem? Wouldn’t that fit better in the physical layer? Also, I noticed a duplicate immediately at the top of the table for layer eight, “enabling a logon warning banner.” Was this done intentionally or was it just a mistake?
The issues section mentions matching vulnerabilities to exploit tools. This wasn’t mentioned at all before in the methodologies or the findings, was this part done? The conclusion statement that “settings and services that are unchanged could be used as channels of attack against the system” misses the point of these exercises. While these may be one place we could attack. What about the things we know are secured in a particular way? Do these open up other possibilities?
Team four’s report shows a lack of academic discipline, no eye for detail and subpar writing skill. The abstract summarizes the lab in an uninformative and uninteresting manner. Is NIST a system to be secured, or a non-vendor organization that provides security documents?
The team has an extremely verbose literature review that doesn’t do much to inform the reader. Each of the articles is given a perfunctory summarization, and not much else. The group mentions lab activities throughout the review, but doesn’t go far enough to tie them into the documents. This combined with the noticeably scarce evaluative content leads the reader to believe that the group either paid little attention to the literature or did not understand it. In one of the few critical statements the group makes, you claim Jajodia et al. errs by stating that a counter-attack is the only means for survival. This is not only either a misinterpretation of the article or a misquote, the group does not back their claim with any evidence. I also noted that several of the citations contain the “n.d.” notation. If the team had simply googled the article titles they would have easily been able to properly complete the academic citation. This further indicates the poor research practices used by team four.
Your Methods section is unclear and unrepeatable. Is the lab constructing tables, or is the group? How did you determine where the vulnerabilities sit on the OSI model? On the McCumber cube? In section two, you say you used a list of patches from the NIST document, and then you mention a list of patches from Microsoft. Which one was it, or was it both? How did you determine which patches to disregard? Aren’t “bugs” potential vulnerabilities? The group mentions they used TechNet, but never properly cites it in text. You state that the site provided “other useful information.” What information was it that you found useful? Your methods section says nothing about assigning tools to exploit the vulnerabilities or testing to prove the concept, as required by the assignment. Did you attempt this?
Your results section contains several statements that belong in the methodology. Can patches be counter-productive? Words like “most” and “a few” are not quantitative and don’t belong in a scholarly work. Especially when you fail to clarify the objects being discussed. Did you through out the section on setting windows policies? Were these in reference to group policy? If you disregarded this section, you did so in error. These are still recommended controls, technology or not, and their absence still creates exploitable vulnerabilities. I’m confused. What did you do with Packit, why did you do it, and what does it have to do with patches? Why did you not match tools with table 1? Why did you even bother with table 2? The document only dealt with service pack 2, not 3.
In your issues section you state that it was hard to match to specific tools because they require scripts or web sites. Wouldn’t the scripts and web sites be the tools?
The group’s conclusion restates information that should be in the results section rather then explaining what was learned or the value of the lab. I’m unclear as to why you went beyond the NIST document to cover service pack 3.
While there are documents and programs that help someone harden their computer, does the fact that these items exist, make the possibility of new exploits being found? Gold Disk is a piece of software that can harden your computer, it can also make it so secure that even you can’t get into it… so can the software itself be an exploit? NIST stands for National Institute of Standards and Technology. Titles of articles or documents need to be properly put into APA 5 format, italicize them so the reading knows where the title ends and your wording starts. Why did the team choose the NIST document? Why not use Microsoft’s document? It is their product after all. N.D. is not an acceptable year for a document. Use the Internet to find the year of publication for articles that do not have it listed. While the team did answer almost all of the questions, it read like a list, “The article…” “The author…” this does not make for a cohesive literature review. Combined the sentences, do not make each one sound like a separate statement. All your sentences need to flow together and not sound like your team is only answering the required bullet points. The team never answered whether they agree with the authors or the articles or why they do not. There is no need to have a citation after the article name; you are not citing something, just stating the title.
The second time the team stated that NIST stands for National Institute of Standards and a Technology. “This lab examines…” “This lab will construct two tables”. You should put the team not the lab. Verb tense in the methodology is in the future. The methods section is the process that the team DID to get the results, not what they will do, that is for the abstract. The team needs to utilize commas more, to better separate their ideas in one sentence. Without them, there are a lot of sentences without the pauses to separate the ideas. In your methods do not tell me what will be in the table, tell me the steps done to determine where the items are placed into the table. In the results, the team states that this lab showed how a security document can be reverse engineered. It was the team’s job to show me how and why the document could be used for harm, that parts seems to be missing. It is good that you had a hard time determining what layer the vulnerability would go into. This means it can affect more than one layer; it is your job to determine what you think was the best place to put it. Where are your lines of the table? It can make for hard reading with the lines to properly separate the items from each other. There seemed to be some duplicates in the table. I don’t know if the team did that be accident while making the table, or their document had it more than once. How are some password vulnerabilities layer 7, and others layer 8?
Team 4 did a decent job with their abstract in that it detailed what they intended to do in lab 5. Their literature review was cohesive and showed a correlation between each of the articles and how they applied to lab 5’s purpose. However, there were APA 5 formatting error in those titles of articles or documents need to be properly formatted. Italicizing them helps the reader know where the title ends and your wording starts. Team did not follow the instructions to answer whether they agreed with or not agreed with what the authors were trying to convey.
Team 4’s methods section is the process of what the team did to get results, it should not include what they plan to do, and this should be discussed up front in the abstract. The team needs to continue to improve upon their grammatical writing skills. Sentences run together making it difficult to read. Team 4’s methods section should have explained the steps performed to determine where items will be placed in their table.
In their results section, team 4 states that this lab showed how a security document can be used for reverse engineering. I was expecting that there would be a discussion on how the document could be used to cause harm. Their table had no lines, this made it very difficult to read.
Overall, I found this team’s lab to be noteworthy in depth, and to examine issues of substantial relevance. The literature review attempted to compare articles, and to point out problems found with the articles: a good move toward thoroughness. The ‘Methodology’ section was sufficient for what was presented; the ‘Results’ section had some interesting discussion. The tables presented were extensive, with the table of the issues addressed in Windows XP Service Pack 3 a nice touch: something which this team alone completed.
That is not to say that some improvements could not be made to this team’s write-up, however. It appears that the literature review only made trivial references to application of concepts in the articles to this exercise. Additionally, at least one misrepresentation was present in the phrase “The authors… somehow concluded that such an attack would be the only way for the victim’s network to continue to function after the attack (Jajodia et al., n.d., p.264).” The article actually states: “To augment methods of avoidance and detection, TVA can be applied to attack response …While [this][sic] approach may be extreme, it ‘could’ [emphasis added] be the only available option…” Obviously, the authors’ of this article appear to be speculating, and do not assert that this necessarily is the ‘only way’ for a network to function after an attack. This is a fairly glaring error, as this team has apparently ‘put words in the mouth’ of this paper’s authors.
Additionally, I take exception to some of the OSI layer classifications made in the first table. For instance, “Use of firewalls on services” is put in layer seven. Is not a firewall functioning at the transport layer, or level four? Additionally, “Use FIPS complaint algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing” applies largely to encrypted connections such as a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) transaction, which despite a having ‘socket’ as part of its name, most likely belongs in layer six. Additionally, for the second table, while using the article title as a description for the service pack issues was a nice idea, for some entries it resulted in meaningless phrases; such as for article number 943055: “Description of the security update for Windows 2000, for Windows XP, for Windows Server 2003, and for Windows Vista: February 12, 2008.” Perhaps something a bit more descriptive would be in order in a case such as this. Finally, the third column in this table seemed rather meaningless: What is “Previous software update type?” I did not see this explained anywhere in the write-up; additionally, why include it in the table if ‘every’ entry in this category is “Security?” It appeared to serve no real purpose, and instead generated unneeded clutter.
Finally, I did not see reference to any test performed with the tools this team found. While it might be somewhat unrealistic to suggest ‘all’ of the tools listed should be tested (as the group notes, some tools require user interaction, and so are likely impractical to evaluate within this exercise), a few of the ‘standalone’ attack tools put to the test would have been a nice touch for thoroughness.
Team 4 begins lab 5 by introducing the topic of vendor documentation and how it is used to secure a computer. They also mention other, non-vendor specific documentation such as the National Institute of Technologies (NIST). They state the objective for this lab, which is to reverse engineer one of these documents to determine vulnerabilities that can be discovered in specific computers. They specify that the document they will be using is the NIST SP800-68 Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP for IT Professionals. They further state that they will be determining the vulnerabilities associated with the document and classifying them by the OSI 7-Layer model and McCumber Cube.
Team 4 includes a literature review of the readings assigned for this week. They begin this section by stating that the articles varied by subject, then proceed with a short description of each article. They then continue with a longer, more in-depth explanation of each article individually. They compare Vulnerability Testing of Software System Using Fault injection (Du, 1998) with Testing with Hostile Data Streams (Jorgensen, 2003) and state that the two have some similarities. They state that the two documents could be used as guides to examine ways to introducing code injection into software to compromise that target computer. Next, they review Viruses 101 (Aycock & Barker, 2005). They give an in-depth description of the article and then relate Viruses 101 to this course since both are controversial and the information presented in both courses can be misused. They include a review of the article Topical Analysis of Network Attack Vulnerability (Jajodia, Noel, O’Berry, n.d., p. 247). The article discusses attack paths from an initial network state to a predetermined attack goal. They considered it an error on the part of the author that he believed it acceptable to initiate a counter-attack against an attacker. This was a moral judgment against the author of the article, and merely the opinion of Team 4. They relate this article to the lab by stating that this technique uses Nessus to scan the network, just as we are doing. Ironically, this lab is about finding vulnerabilities without using tools.
In the next section, Team 4 discusses the methodology used in this lab. They restate the security documentation that they will be using and the objectives of the lab as described in the abstract. In part one they listed each one of the recommended configurations, identified the vulnerability that it’s designed to protect, classified them by the OSI 7-Layer Model and then classified them by the McCumber Cube. For the second part, they located the recommended security updates, and determined the vulnerability it was designed to protect. Team 4 determined that most of the security configurations applied to the application layer of the OSI Model. They also determined that someone could use the listed of recommended security patches to exploit a system who’s security patches are not up to date. They conclude that most vulnerabilities come from malicious websites or email that run scripts on the vulnerable machine.
Team begins with the abstract and described what is going to occur during the lab. They then state that they are going to be using the National Institute of Standards and Technology documentation for both Windows XP SP 2 and SP 0. They also state they will examine the service packs and software rolls. The team then goes onto the literature review section. Again this week the team splits the literature instead of creating a cohesive literature review. They provide just an abstract of each article without comparing and arguing each the main points from the articles. They did give an overview of what all the articles. But when trying to learn the information it is important to question things to find out more information and how they work. The group then goes onto the methodology section. Here they describe what they are going to do with the hands on portion of the lab. They provided the number of the NIST documentation that they used within the lab. They then go on to discuss the different steps required for the lab. Next they go onto the findings section. This section did not give a lot of detail on the different attacks that they used just that they went through the documentation. When reading the lab they did give some information for SOHO vulnerability but this was the most detail outside of explaining the purpose of the NIST documentation. They did not even discuss the tables within this portion of the lab. After the results they provide their issue section and the problem that occurred within this week’s lab. But this was information that did not seem to be a problem then more of what they found while doing the lab and could have been placed in the previous section. The team goes onto finish with the conclusion. This part of the document was an overview of what they discussed earlier and did not leave anything besides what was stated from before. They could have discussed something with reverse engineering and pick arguments from the lab. They provided there tables at the end of the document. These where well structured but at first glance it does not look like a table rather it looks more like a list. Overall this lab could have provided more information and the team could have given arguments and theories to the information gathered within this lab. When trying to review a lab that is missing items it does not give the chance think of questions, and ask why the group did what they did and why they think of what they provided.
I think that group 4’s write-up for lab 5 was good. The abstract for this lab was adequate and provided a short overview of the lab. The literary review was good and adequately reviewed the material. Group 2 answered all of the required questions for each reading. All of the citing for the literary review was done well and all of the pages were included. For this lab, the group answered all of the required questions and provided a good amount of detail about the NIST document that they used. The group also included a very extensive table that indicates many vulnerabilities found in the document and how they relate to the McCumber Cube. The group also covered many patches released for Windows XP SP3 and use Microsoft’s TechNet site to research them and include them in their table. However, the group did not test their hypothesis of exploits that should work. The conclusion was adequate and summarizes what was covered. Overall, the lab had a good amount of vulnerabilities and seemed to be an improvement from last week’s lab.
The team starts out with a strong abstract and they talk about they are going to use a non-vendor specific organization, such as the national institute of standards and technologies (NIST), for securing computers. The team indicates that they will be reviewing NIST document SP800-68 Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT Professionals: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist. In the methodology section the team needed a list of patches from Microsoft’s website, however they stated that they included patches in service pack 3. Before that they indicated that the NIST document is for service pack 2, would increasing the service level effect the recommend configuration from the NIST document? Perhaps a newer service pack would fix security issues that were present before hand? There tables seem to lack organization which became difficult to read. I notice that Change the required the combination of Ctrl+Alt+Del to activate the logon screen. The exploit was Easier to gain password information. Right before that is the change to not display last user logon. The question I have is with this combination, how would one gain password information which is the exploit for not requiring Ctrl+Alt+Del? In the second table the article numbers have hyperlinks which seem to not be complete. The links will take you to Microsoft support but not to the article. Overall the team discovered the same similarity as the other teams, where most of the exploits were in layer 7 of the OSI model.
Team four begins their lab report with their abstract. That abstract does a good job of giving an overview of the topic for the lab as well as what team four will be doing to complete the lab. The abstract meets the requirements of the syllabus. In lab five team four has at least tired to make an improvement into their literature review process. In previous labs, team four had trouble creating cohesion between the articles that were presented for review. In lab five they have an introduction to the literature review that shows how the articles relate to each other, and then go into the actual review. That review begins as attempting to relate the articles to each other in a cohesion attempt, but by the end of the literature review that attempt was gone. The literature still reads mostly as a list or articles and an almost entirely independent review of each one. The major benefit here being that there is no longer a heading with the name of the article. While this is an improvement for team four, more improvement could easily be made with just a little more effort to relate the articles. With only two labs remaining this will hopefully be worked out by the end of the semester. Team four does however answer the questions posted in the syllabus in regards to the literature review process. The methods section of team four’s lab starts out and reads much like the abstract. While I’m sure it was not directly copied and pasted, it does seem to be a restatement of the abstract. The entire methods section is way too short. While it explains the steps that team four will perform it is not nearly long enough to explain in enough detail the process that others could use to recreate the experiment. This does not constitute an academic or scholarly methods section. It also appears that they refer to NIST as a different organization in their methods section as opposed to their abstract. NIST stands for the National Institute of Standards and Technology. While they refer to it as such in the abstract they call it the “the national institute of standards and a technology” in the methods section. If I recall correctly NIST works with more than just ONE technology. The findings section presented by team four is rather high level and briefly glances at each of the sections of the lab design document. The tables presented by team four are very difficult to read and understand based on the lack of any grid lines to divide up the different sections. Being as I had that problem in lab one, I question teams four’s approach as adding grid lines is not difficult at all. Based on the short methods section presented by team four for lab five, the conclusions they drew, more on what they did, and less on any physical evidence from the lab are supportable. The final thing I found questionable was the lack discussion on getting instructor approval. Teams one, two, and three included at least a sentence on that topic.