Short post to posit a what if. “What if” you could analyze the entire network infrastructure of the electric power grid, water grid, the command and control networks (cyber grid) and any other utilities to find logical and geographic connections between the grids? 
There are a variety of engineering disciplines that look at failure analysis methods, cascading failures, keystone, and so much more. Most of the methods are discipline specific even though for example the military has “systems of systems” as a thought process. Within the realm of information warfare where there is a cognitive, physical and information dimension the network analysis takes on a new capability.
There has been substantial research looking at networks (systems) and how they can be analyzed whether the network is a radicalized terrorist group or an electric grid. There has been fewer researchers looking at how the different networks connect but usually only with the same domain (terrorist groups working with other terrorist groups as an example). There is some excellent work that looks at how networks can effect each other (electric grid effecting computing as an example). There is however substantially less looking at the connections between the command and control (C2) networks of the different utilities. Unlike geographic dispersion the command and control systems are found in logical and geographic space. They are also connected in different ways to each other with that connection sometimes being computer and sometimes being through a human being. 
From a cyber warfare aspect finding where these unexpected connections specifically of command and control networks exist in the same space results in an attack vector or defense issue. Expand the definition beyond the packet network. Expand the idea of how the connections are made and twist that little section in your brain and examine “what if”. This new area that can be identified is very interesting from that aspect.
Professor: Very intriguing post — one that has consumed a lot of my and my colleagues’ (at JFCOM) brain cells for several years.
One the one hand, there is remarkable vulnerability in many legacy nets (be they SCADA or power or water): disrupt a few key nodes and you perturb a massive area (remember the Aug. 2003 blackout in NY state?). Besides John Robb’s work, this is an area where JWAC excels (former Navy program that has evolved into a joint program in support of the Combatant Commands).
One the flip side is the question of resilience: how adaptable is the aggregate system to such perturbations. Some resilience is a by-product of modularity within holistic architectures (not be deliberate design, but by incremental evolution of systems like the power grid); an outage in one area will not catastrophically impact other parts of the network simply because the binding in the network is not that strong.
Other kinds of resilience are deliberate. Robb’s notion of a “resilient community” is one example where self-sufficiency is the primary means of protecting against systemic vulnerabilities. As an example, consider the rural family who has septic waste disposal, geothermal HVAC, well water and a generator or solar PV array for electricity. Denial of service attacks would have to be too granular to be cost effective in order to deny these consumers their services.
Urban settings (a by-product of industrial age mechanization and linear production methods) are far more difficult to achieve individual self-sufficiency, and therefore remain the least resilient. But other economies of scale (particular in supply chain values and transportation) make them a desirable lifestyle choice.
Where I believe we are seeing convergence is the expanding power of social analytics with the increasing integration of information services. While historians like Zenpundit began careers immersed in the stacks — with a very low bitrate of information access — the challenge today is sifting through the Internet’s minuscule signal-to-noise ratio for relevant data.
This is why C2 is ripe for doctrinal change. The prevailing doctrine in the U.S. military is still dependent upon unity of command, hierarchy of organization, and emphasis on the communication of information to commanders.
Rather than restricting capabilities to conform to anachronistic doctrines, the coming decade will provide enhanced tools for local decision making and empowerment — and, with it, increased resilience and effectiveness.